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Abstract
Enterprise network traffic typically traverses a sequence of
middleboxes forming a service function chain, or simply a
chain. Tolerating failures when they occur along chains is
imperative to the availability and reliability of enterprise ap-
plications. Making a chain fault-tolerant is challenging since,
in the event of failures, the state of faulty middleboxes must
be correctly and quickly recovered while providing high
throughput and low latency.
In this paper, we introduce FTC, a system design and pro-
tocol for fault-tolerant service function chaining. FTC pro-
vides strong consistency with up to f middlebox failures for
chains of length f + 1 or longer without requiring dedicated
replica nodes. In FTC, state updates caused by packet pro-
cessing at a middlebox are collected, piggybacked onto the
packet, and sent along the chain to be replicated. Our eval-
uation shows that compared with the state of art [49], FTC
improves throughput by 2–3.5× for a chain of two to five
middleboxes.
1 Introduction
Middleboxes are widely deployed in enterprise networks,
with each providing a specific dataplane function. These
functions can be composed to meet high-level service re-
quirements by passing traffic through an ordered sequence of
middleboxes, forming a service function chain [43, 44]. For
instance, data center traffic commonly passes through an in-
trusion detection system, a firewall, and a network address
translator before reaching the Internet [57].
Providing fault tolerance for middleboxes is critical as
their failures have led to large network outages, significant
financial losses, and left networks vulnerable to attacks [11,
42,53,54]. Existing middlebox frameworks [28,30,33,45,49]
have focused on providing fault tolerance for individual mid-
dleboxes. For a chain, they consider individual middleboxes
as fault tolerant units that together form a fault tolerant chain.
This design introduces redundancies and overheads that can
limit a chain’s performance.
Independently replicating the state of each middlebox in
a chain requires a large number replica servers, which can
increase cost. Part of that cost can be mitigated by having
middleboxes share the same replica servers, although over-
sharing can affect performance. More importantly, replica-
tion causes packets to experience more than twice its nor-
mal delay, since each middlebox synchronously replicates
state updates before releasing a packet to the next middle-
box [28, 30, 33, 45].
Current state-of-the-art middlebox frameworks also stall
as they capture a consistent snapshot of their state leading
to lower throughput and higher latency [33, 45, 49]. These
stalls significantly increase latency with packets experienc-
ing latencies from 400 µs to 9 ms per middlebox compared
to 10–100 µs without fault tolerance [33, 45]. When these
frameworks are used in a chain, the stalls cause processing
delays across the entire chain, similar to a pipeline stall in a
processor. As a result, we observed a∼40% drop in through-
put for a chain of five middleboxes as compared to a single
middlebox (see § 7.4).
In this paper, we introduce a system called fault toler-
ant chaining (FTC) that provides fault tolerance to an en-
tire chain. FTC is inspired by chain replication [56] to effi-
ciently provide fault tolerance. At each middlebox, FTC col-
lects state updates due to packet processing and piggybacks
them onto the packet. As the packet passes through the chain,
FTC replicates piggybacked state updates in servers hosting
middleboxes. This allows each server hosting a middlebox to
act as a replica for its predecessor middleboxes. If a middle-
box fails, FTC can recover the lost state from its successor
servers. For middleboxes at the end of the chain, FTC trans-
fers and replicates their state updates in servers hosting mid-
dleboxes at the beginning of the chain. FTC does not need
any dedicated replica servers.
We extend chain replication [56] to address challenges
unique to a service function chain. Unlike the original proto-
col where all nodes run an identical process, FTC must sup-
port a chain comprised of different middleboxes processing
traffic in the service function chain order. Accordingly, FTC
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allows all servers to process traffic and replicate state. More-
over, FTC’s failure recovery instantiates a new middlebox at
the failure position to maintain the service function chain or-
der, rather than the traditional protocol that appends a new
node at the end of a chain.
Furthermore, FTC improves the usability and performance
of multicore middleboxes. We introduce packet transactions
to provide a simple programming model to develop multi-
threaded middleboxes that can effectively make use of multi-
ple cores. Concurrent state updates to middlebox state result
in non-deterministic behavior that is hard to restore. A trans-
actionalmodel for state updates allows serializing concurrent
state accesses that simplifies reasoning about bothmiddlebox
and FTC correctness. The state of the art [49] relies on com-
plex static analysis that supports unmodified applications, but
can have worse performance when its analysis falls short.
FTC also tracks dependencies among transactions using
data dependency vectors that define a partial ordering of
transactions. The partial ordering allows a replica to concur-
rently apply state updates from non-dependent transactions
to improve replication performance. This approach has two
major benefits compared to thread-based approaches that al-
low concurrent state replication by replaying the operations
of threads [49]. First, FTC can support vertical scaling by re-
placing a running middlebox with a new instance with more
CPU cores or failing over to a server with fewer CPU cores
when resources are scarce during a major outage. Second, it
enables a middlebox and its replicas to run with a different
number of threads.
FTC is implemented on Click [32] and uses the ONOS
SDN controller [7]. We compare its performance with the
state of the art in [49]. Our results for a chain of two to five
middleboxes show that FTC improves the throughput of the
state of art [49] by 2× to 3.5× with lower latency per mid-
dlebox.
2 Background
A service function chain is an ordered sequence of middle-
boxes. Today, following the network function virtualization
(NFV) vision [1], most middleboxes are implemented as soft-
ware running on commodity hardware.
In an NFV environment, as shown in Figure 1, an orches-
trator manages and steers traffic through a chain of middle-
boxes. Eachmiddlebox runsmultiple threads and is equipped
with a multi-queue network interface card (NIC) [15,40,48].
A thread receives packets from a NIC’s input queue and
sends packets to a NIC’s output queue. Figure 1 shows two
threaded middleboxes processing two traffic flows.
Stateful middleboxes keep dynamic state for packets that
they process [23, 50]. For instance, a stateful firewall fil-
ters packets based on statistics that it collects for network
flows [6], and a network address translator (NAT) maps inter-
nal and external addresses using a flow table [24, 51].
Middlebox state can be partitionable or shared [6, 20, 22,
Orchestrator
!" Middlebox
!" !"!"
Packet
SDN Network
Figure 1: Service function chain model in NFV
45]. Partitionable state variables describe the state of a sin-
gle traffic flow (e.g., MTU size and timeouts in stateful fire-
walls [6, 20]) and are only accessed by a single middlebox
thread. Shared state variables are for a collection of flows,
and multiple middlebox threads query and update them (e.g.,
port-counts in an intrusion detection system).
A stateful middlebox is subject to both hardware and soft-
ware failures that can cause the loss of its state [42, 49]. We
model these failures as fail-stop in which failures are de-
tectable, and failed components are not restored.
2.1 Challenges
To recover from a middlebox failure, traffic must be rerouted
to a redundant middlebox where the state of the failed mid-
dlebox is restored. State replication has two challenges that
affect middlebox performance.
First, in a multithreaded middlebox, the order in which in-
terleaving threads access shared state is non-deterministic.
Parallel updates can lead to observable states that are hard-to-
restore. The difficulty in achieving high performance multi-
threaded middleboxes is how we capture this state for recov-
ery. One approach to accommodate non-determinism is to
log any state read and write, which allows restoring any ob-
servable state from the logs [49]. However, this complicates
the failure recovery procedure because of record/replay, and
leads to high performance overheads during normal opera-
tion.
Second, to tolerate f failures, a packet is released only
when at least f + 1 replicas acknowledge that state updates
due to processing of this packet are replicated. In addi-
tion to increasing latency, synchronous replication reduces
throughput since expensive coordinations between packet
processing and state replication are required for consistency
(e.g., pausing packet processing until replication is acknowl-
edged [28, 30, 33, 45]). The overhead of this synchrony for
a middlebox depends on where its replicas are located, and
how state updates are transferred to these locations. For a
solution designed for individual middleboxes, the overheads
can accumulate for each middlebox of a chain.
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2.2 Limitations of Existing Approaches
Existing middlebox frameworks provide fault tolerance for
individual middleboxes. Using these frameworks for a chain
whose middleboxes are deployed over multiple servers sig-
nificantly impacts the chain’s performance. These frame-
works use one of two approaches.
A class of frameworks take snapshots of middlebox state
for state replication [33, 45, 49]. While taking snapshot, mid-
dlebox operations are stalled for consistency. These frame-
works take snapshots at different rates. They take snapshots
per packet or packet-batch introducing 400 µs to 8–9 ms
of per packet latency overhead [33, 45]. Periodic snapshots
(e.g., at every 20–200 ms intervals) can cause periodic la-
tency spikes up to 6 ms [49]. We measure that per middlebox
snapshots cause 40% throughput drop going from a single
middlebox to a chain of five middleboxes (see § 7.4).
Other frameworks [28, 30] redesign middleboxes to sepa-
rate and push state into a fault tolerant backend data store.
This separation incurs high performance penalties. Access-
ing state takes at least a round trip delay. Moreover, a middle-
box can release a packet only when it receives an acknowl-
edgement from the data store that relevant state updates are
replicated. Due to such overheads, the middlebox throughput
can drop by ∼60% [28] and reduce to 0.5 Gbps (for packets
with 1434 B median size) [30]
3 System Design Overview
The limitations of existing work lead us to design fault tol-
erant chaining (FTC); a new approach that replicates state
along the chain to provide fault tolerance.
3.1 Requirements
We design FTC to provide fault tolerance for a wide variety
of middleboxes. FTC adheres to four requirements:
Correct recovery: FTC ensures that the middlebox behav-
ior after a failure recovery is consistent with the behavior
prior to the failure [52]. To tolerate f failures, a packet can
only be released outside of a chain once all necessary infor-
mation needed to reconstruct the internal state of all middle-
boxes is replicated to f + 1 servers.
Low overhead and fast failure recovery: Fault tolerance
for a chain must come with low overhead. A chain processes
a high traffic volume and middlebox state can be modified
very frequently. At eachmiddlebox of a chain, latency should
be within 10 to 100 µs [49], and the fault tolerance mecha-
nismmust support accessing variables 100 k to 1M times per
second [49]. Recovery time must be short enough to prevent
application outages. For instance, highly available services
timeout in just a few seconds [3].
Resource efficiency: Finally, the fault tolerance solution
should be resource efficient. To isolate the effect of possible
failures, replicas of a middlebox must be deployed on sepa-
rate physical servers. We are interested in a system that dedi-
cates the fewest servers to achieve a fixed replication factor.
3.2 Design Choices
We model packet processing as a transaction. FTC carefully
collects updated values of state variables modified during a
packet transaction and appends them to the packet. As the
packet passes through the chain, FTC replicates piggybacked
state updates in servers hosting the middleboxes.
Transactional packet processing: To accommodate non-
determinism due to concurrency, we model the processing
of a packet as a transaction, where concurrent accesses to
shared state are serialized to ensure that consistent state is
captured and replicated. In other systems, the interleaved or-
der of lock acquisitions and state variable updates between
threads is non-deterministic, yet externally observable. Cap-
turing and replaying this order is complex and incurs high
performance overheads [49]. FTC uses transactional packet
processing to avoid the complexity and overhead.
This model is easily adaptable to hybrid transactional
memory, where we can take advantage of the hardware sup-
port for transactions [13]. This allows FTC to use mod-
ern hardware transactional memory for better performance,
when the hardware is present.
We also observe that this model does not reduce concur-
rency in popular middleboxes. First, these middleboxes al-
ready serialize access to state variables for correctness. For
instance, a load balancer and a NAT ensure connection per-
sistence (i.e., a connection is always directed to a unique des-
tination) while accessing a shared flow table [9, 51]. Concur-
rent threads in these middleboxesmust coordinate to provide
this property.
Moreover, most middleboxes share only a few state vari-
ables [28, 30]. Kablan et al. surveyed five middleboxes for
their access patterns to state [28]. These middleboxes mostly
perform only one or two read/write operations per packet.
The behavior of these middleboxes allow packet transactions
to run concurrently most of the time.
In-chain replication: Consensus-based state replica-
tion [34, 38] requires 2 f + 1 replicas for each middlebox
to reliably detect and recover from f failures. A high-
availability cluster approach requires f + 1 replicas as it
relies on a fault tolerant coordinator for failure detection. For
a chain of n middleboxes, these schemes need n× (2 f + 1)
and n× ( f + 1) replicas. Replicas are placed on separate
servers, and a naïve placement requires the same number of
servers.
FTC observes that packets already flow through a chain;
each server hosting a middlebox of the chain can serve as a
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replica for the other middleboxes. Instead of allocating dedi-
cated replicas, FTC replicates the state of middleboxes across
the chain. In this way, FTC tolerates f failures without the
cost of dedicated replica servers.
State piggybacking: To replicate state modified by a
packet, existing schemes send separate messages to replicas.
In FTC, a packet carries its own state updates. State piggy-
backing is possible, as a small number of state variables [31]
are modified with each packet. Since state updated during
processing a packet is replicated in servers hosting the chain,
relevant state is already transferred and replicated when the
packet leaves the chain.
No checkpointing and no replay: FTC replicates state
values at the granularity of packet transactions, rather than
taking snapshots of state or replaying packet processing op-
erations. During normal operation, FTC removes state up-
dates that have been applied in all replicas to bound memory
usage of replication. Furthermore, replicating the values of
state variables allows for fast state recovery during failover.
Centralized orchestration: In our system, a central or-
chestrator manages the network and chains. The orchestra-
tor deploys fault tolerant chains, reliably monitors them, de-
tects their failures, and initiates failure recovery. The orches-
trator functionality is provided by a fault tolerant SDN con-
troller [7,29,39]. After deploying a chain, the orchestrator is
not involved in normal chain operations to avoid becoming a
performance bottleneck.
In the following sections, we first describe our protocol for
a single middlebox in § 4, then we extend this protocol for a
chain of middleboxes in § 5.
4 FTC for a Single Middlebox
In this section, we present our protocol for a single middle-
box. We first describe our protocol with a single threaded
middlebox where state is replicated by single threaded repli-
cas. We extend our protocol to support multithreadedmiddle-
boxes and multithreaded replication in § 4.2 and § 4.3.
4.1 Middlebox State Replication
We adapt the chain replication protocol [56] for middle-
box state replication. For reliable state transmission between
servers, FTC uses sequence numbers, similar to TCP, to han-
dle out-of-order deliveries and packet drops within the net-
work.
Figure 2 shows our protocol for providing fault tolerance
for a middlebox. FTC replicates the middlebox state in
f + 1 replicas during normal middlebox operations. Repli-
cas r1, . . . ,r f+1 form the replication group for middlebox m
where r1 and r f+1 are called the head and tail replicas. Each
replica is placed on a separate server whose failure is isolated.
!
!" !" !"#$
Head Tail
Piggyback log
Packet
Replica
! Middlebox
!"
State store
………
Figure 2: Normal operation for a single middlebox. The head
and middlebox reside in the same server. The head tracks
state updates due to middlebox packet processing and ap-
pends a piggyback log containing these updates to the packet.
As the packet passes through the chain, other replicas repli-
cate the piggyback log and apply the carried state updates to
their state stores. Finally, the tail strips the piggyback log and
releases the packet.
With state replicated in f +1 replicas, the state remains avail-
able even if f replicas fail.
The head is co-located with the middlebox in the same
server. The middlebox state is separated from the middlebox
logic and is stored in the head’s state store. The head pro-
vides a state management API for the middlebox to read and
write state during packet processing.
Normal operation of protocol: As shown in Figure 2, the
middlebox processes a packet, and the head constructs and
appends a piggyback log to the packet. The piggyback log
contains a sequence number and a list of state updates during
packet processing. As the packet traverses the chain, each
subsequent replica replicates the piggyback log and applies
the state updates to its state store. After replication, the tail
strips the piggyback log and releases the packet.
The head tracks middlebox updates to state using a mono-
tonically increasing sequence number. After a middlebox fin-
ishes processing a packet, the head increments its sequence
number only if state was modified during packet processing.
The head appends the state updates (i.e., state variables mod-
ified in processing the packet and their updated values) and
sequence number to the packet as a piggyback log. If no state
was updated, the head adds a no-op piggyback log. The head
then forwards the packet to the next replica.
Each replica continuously receives packets with piggy-
back logs. If a packet is lost, a replica requests its predeces-
sor to re-transmit the piggyback log with the lost sequence
number. A replica keeps the largest sequence number that it
has received in order (i.e., the replica has already received
all piggyback logs with preceding sequence numbers). Once
all prior piggyback logs are received, the replica applies the
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piggyback log to its local state store and forwards the packet
to the next replica.
The tail replicates state updates, strips the piggyback log
from the packet, and releases the packet to its destination.
Subsequently, the tail periodically disseminates its largest se-
quence number to the head. The sequence number is propa-
gated to all replicas so they can prune their piggyback logs
up to this sequence number.
Correctness: Each replica replicates the per-packet state
updates in order. As a result, when a replica forwards a
packet, it has replicated all preceding piggyback logs. Pack-
ets also pass through the replication group in order. When
a packet reaches a replica, prior replicas have replicated the
state updates carried by this packet. Thus, when the tail re-
leases a packet, the packet has already traversed the entire
replication group. The replication group has f + 1 replicas
allowing FTC to tolerate f failures.
Failure recovery: FTC relies on a fault tolerant orches-
trator to reliably detect failures. Upon failure detection, the
replication group is repaired in three steps: adding a new
replica, recovering the lost state from an alive replica, and
steering traffic through the new replica.
In the event of a head failure, the orchestrator instantiates
a new middlebox instance and replica, as they reside on the
same server. The orchestrator also informs the new replica
about other alive replicas. If the new replica fails, the orches-
trator restarts the recovery procedure.
Selecting a replica as the source for state recovery de-
pends on how state updates propagate through the chain. We
can reason about this using the log propagation invariant:
for each replica except the tail, its successor replica has the
same or prior state, since piggyback logs propagate in order
through the chain.
If the head fails, the new replica retrieves the state store,
piggyback logs, and sequence number from the immediate
successor to the head. If other replicas fail, the new replica
fetches the state from the immediate predecessor.
To ensure that the log propagation invariant holds during
recovery, the replica that is the source for state recovery dis-
cards any out-of-order packets that have not been applied to
its state store and will no longer admit packets in flight. If
the contacted replica fails during recovery, the orchestrator
detects this failure and re-initializes the new replica with the
new set of alive replicas.
Finally, the orchestrator updates routing rules in the net-
work to steer traffic through the new replica. If multiple repli-
cas have failed, the orchestrator waits until all new replicas
acknowledge that they have successfully recovered the state.
Then, the orchestrator updates the necessary routing rules
from the tail to the head.
4.2 Concurrent Packet Processing
To achieve higher performance, we augment our protocol to
supportmultithreaded packet processing and state replication
in the middlebox and the head. Other replicas are still single
threaded. Later in § 4.3, we will support multithreaded repli-
cations in other replicas.
In concurrent packet processing, multiple packets are pro-
cessed in interleaving threads. The threads can access the
same state variables in parallel. To accommodate this par-
allelism, FTC must consistently track parallel state updates.
We introduce transactional packet processing that effectively
serializes packet processing. This model supports concur-
rency if packet transactions access disjoint subsets of state.
Transactional Packet Processing: In concurrent packet
processing, the effects on state variables must be serializ-
able. Further, state updates must be applied to replicas in the
same order so that the system can be restored to a consis-
tent state during failover. To support this requirement, replay
based replication systems, such as FTMB [49], track all state
accesses, including state reads, which can be challenging to
perform efficiently.
In transactional packet processing, state reads and writes
by a packet transaction have no impact on another concur-
rently processed packet. This isolation allows us to only keep
track of the relative order between transactions,without need-
ing to track all state variable dependencies.
We realize this model by implementing a software transac-
tional memory (STM) API for middleboxes. When a packet
arrives, the runtime starts a new packet transaction in which
multiple reads and writes can be performed. Our STM API
uses fine grained strict two phase locking (similar to [14]) to
provide serializability. Our API uses a wound-wait scheme
that aborts transaction to prevent possible deadlocks if a lock
ordering is not known in advance. An aborted transaction
is immediately re-executed. The transaction completes when
the middlebox releases the packet.
Using two phase locking, the head runtime acquires neces-
sary locks during a packet transaction.We simplify lockman-
agement using state space partitioning, by using the hash of
state variable keys to map keys to partitions, each with its
own lock. The state partitioning is consistent across all repli-
cas, and to reduce contention, the number of partitions is se-
lected to exceed the maximum number of CPU cores.
At the end of a transaction, the head atomically increments
its sequence number only if state was updated during this
packet transaction. Then, the head constructs a piggyback log
containing the state updates and the sequence number. After
the transaction completes, the head appends the piggyback
log to the packet and forwards the packet to the next replica.
Correctness: Due to mutual exclusion, when a packet
transaction includes an updated state variable in a piggyback
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log, no other concurrent transaction has modified this vari-
able, thus the included value is consistent with the final value
of the packet transaction. The head’s sequence number maps
this transaction to a valid serial order. Replicated values are
consistent with the head, because replicas apply state updates
of the transaction in the sequence number order.
4.3 Concurrent State Replication
Up to now FTC provides concurrent packet processing but
does not support concurrent replication. The head uses a sin-
gle sequence number to determine a total order of transac-
tions that modify state partitions. This total ordering elimi-
nates multithreaded replication at successor replicas.
To address the possible replication bottleneck, we intro-
duce data dependency vectors to support concurrent state
replication. Data dependency tracking is inspired by the vec-
tor clocks algorithm [19], but rather than tracking points
in time when events happen for processes or threads, FTC
tracks the points in time when packet transactions modify
state partitions.
This approach providesmore flexibility compared to track-
ing dependencies between threads and replaying their opera-
tions to replicate the state [49]. First, it easily supports ver-
tical scaling as a running middlebox can be replaced with a
new instance with different number of CPU cores. Second, a
middlebox and its replicas can also run with different number
of threads. The state-of-the-art [49] requires the same num-
ber of threads with a one-to-one mapping between a middle-
box and its replicas.
Data dependency vectors: We use data dependency vec-
tors to determine a partial order of transactions in the head.
Each element of this vector is a sequence number associated
to a state partition. A packet piggybacks this partial order
to replicas enabling them to replicate transactions with more
concurrency; a replica can apply and replicate a transaction
in a different serial order that is still equivalent to the head.
The head keeps a data dependency vector and serializes
parallel accesses to this vector using the same state partition
locks from our transactional packet processing. The head
maintains its dependency vector using the following rules. A
read-only transaction does not change the vector. For other
transactions, the head increments the sequence number of a
state partition that received any read or write.
In a piggyback log, we replace the sequence numberwith a
dependency vector that represents the effects of a transaction
on state partitions. If the transaction does not access a state
partition, the head uses a “don’t-care” value for this partition
in the piggyback log. The head obtains the sequence number
of other partitions from the head’s dependency vector before
incrementing their sequence numbers.
Each successor replica keeps a dependency vector MAX
that tracks the latest piggyback log that it has replicated in
order, i.e., it has already received all piggyback logs prior to
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Figure 3: Data dependency vectors. The head and the replica
run two threads and maintain a dependency vector for three
state partitions.
MAX . In case a packet is lost, a replica requests its predeces-
sor to retransmit missing piggyback logs.
Upon receiving a packet, a replica compares the piggy-
backed dependency vector with itsMAX . The replica ignores
state partitions with “don’t care” from this comparison. Once
all prior piggyback logs have been received and applied, the
replica applies and replicates the piggyback log. For other
state partitions, the replica increments their associated se-
quence numbers inMAX .
Example: Figure 3 shows an example of using data depen-
dency vectors in the head and a successor replica with two
threads. The head and the replica begin with the same de-
pendency vector for three state partitions. First, the head per-
forms a packet transaction that writes to state partition 1 and
increments the associated sequence number. The piggyback
log belonging to this transaction contains “don’t care” value
for state partitions 2 and 3 (denoted by x), since the transac-
tion did not read or write these partitions. Second, the head
performs another transaction and forwards the packet with a
piggyback log.
Third, as shown the second packet arrives to the replica
before the first packet. Since the piggybacked dependency
vector is out of order, the replica holds the packet. Fourth,
the the first packet arrives. Since the piggybacked vector is
in order, the replica applies the piggyback log and updates its
local dependency vector accordingly. Fifth, by applying the
piggyback log of the first packet, the replica now can apply
the piggyback log of the held packet.
5 FTC for a Chain
In this section, we describe our protocol for a chain to enable
every middlebox to replicate the chain’s state while process-
ing packets. To accomplish this, we extend the original chain
replication protocol [56] during both normal operation and
failure recovery.
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Figure 4: Normal operation for a chain. A middlebox mi and
its head replica ri reside in the same server. The forwarder
and buffer are located in the first and last servers. A replica
ri tracks state updates of a middlebox mi and adds a piggy-
back message including the state updates to the packet. As
the packet traverses the chain, each replica replicates relevant
carried state updates. Replicas at the beginning of the chain
replicate for middleboxes at the end of the chain. The buffer
withholds the packet from release until the state updates of
middleboxes at the end of the chain are replicated. The buffer
transfers the piggybackmessage to the forwarder that adds it
to incoming packets for state replication.
A chain consists of different middlebox applications.
Thus, FTC must allow different middleboxes to run across
the chain, while the original chain replication protocol sup-
ports running an identical process across the nodes. FTC’s
failure recovery instantiates a new middlebox at the failure
position to maintain the chain order, while the traditional pro-
tocol appends a new node at the end of a chain.
Figure 4 shows our protocol for a chain of n middleboxes.
Our protocol can be thought of as running n instances (per
middlebox) of the protocol developed earlier in § 4. FTC
places a replica per each middlebox. Replicas form n repli-
cation groups, each of which provides fault tolerance for a
single middlebox.
Viewing a chain as a logical ring, the replication group of a
middlebox consists of a replica and its f succeeding replicas.
Instead of being dedicated to a single middlebox, a replica is
shared among f +1 middleboxes and maintains a state store
for each of them. Among these middleboxes, a replica is the
head of one replication group and the tail of another replica-
tion group. For instance in Figure 4, if f = 1 then the replica
r1 is in the replication groups of middleboxesm1 andmn, and
r2 is in the replication groups of m1 and m2. Subsequently,
the replicas rn and r1 are the head and the tail of middlebox
mn.
FTC adds two additional elements, the forwarder and
buffer at the ingress and egress of a chain. The forwarder
and buffer are also multithreaded, and are collocated with the
first and last middleboxes. The buffer holds a packet until the
state updates associated with all middleboxes of the chain
have been replicated. The buffer also forwards state updates
to the forwarder for middleboxes with replicas at the begin-
ning of the chain. The forwarder adds state updates from the
buffer to incoming packets before forwarding the packets to
the first middlebox.
5.1 Normal Operation of Protocol
Figure 4 shows the normal operation of our protocol. The
forwarder receives incoming packets from the outside world
and piggyback messages from the buffer. A piggyback mes-
sage contains middlebox state updates. As the packet passes
through the chain, a replica detaches and replicates the rele-
vant parts of the piggyback message and applies associated
state updates to its state stores. A replica ri tracks the state
updates of a middlebox mi and updates the piggyback mes-
sage to include these state updates. Replicas at the beginning
of the chain replicate for middleboxes at the end of the chain.
The buffer withholds the packet from release until the state
updates of middleboxes at the end of the chain are replicated.
The buffer transfers the piggyback message to the forwarder
that adds it to incoming packets for state replication.
The forwarder receives incoming packets from outside
world and piggybackmessages from the buffer. A piggyback
message consists of a list of piggyback logs and a list of com-
mit vectors. The tail of each replication group appends a com-
mit vector to announce the latest state updates that have been
replicated f + 1 times for the corresponding middlebox.
Each replica constantly receives packets with piggyback
messages. A replica detaches and processes a piggyback
message before the packet transaction. As mentioned before,
each replica is in the replication group of f precedingmiddle-
boxes. For each of them, the replica maintains a dependency
vectorMAX to track the latest piggyback log that it has repli-
cated in order. The replica processes a relevant piggyback log
from the piggyback message as described in § 4.3. Once all
prior piggyback logs are applied, the replica replicates the
piggyback log, applies state updates to the associated state
store, and updates the associated dependency vectorMAX .
Once the middlebox finishes the packet transaction, the
replica updates and reattaches the piggyback message to the
packet, then forwards the packet. For the replication group
where the replica is the head, it adds a piggyback log contain-
ing the state updates of processing the packet. If the replica
is a tail in the replication group of a middleboxm, it removes
the piggyback log belonging to middlebox m to reduce the
size of the piggyback message. The reason is that a tail repli-
cates the state updates ofm for f +1-th time. Moreover, it at-
taches its dependency vectorMAX of middleboxm as a com-
mit vector. Later by reading this commit vector, the buffer
can safely release held packets. Successor replicas also use
this commit vector to prune obsolete piggyback logs.
To correctly release a packet, the buffer requires that the
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state updates of this packet are replicated, specifically for
each middlebox with a preceding tail in the chain. The buffer
withholds a packet from release until an upcoming packet
piggybacks commit vectors that confirmmeeting this require-
ment. Upon receiving an upcoming packet, the buffer pro-
cesses the piggybacked commit vectors to release packets
held in the memory.
Specifically, let m be a middlebox with a preceding tail,
andV2 be the end of updated range from a piggyback log of a
held packet belonging to m. Once the commit vector of each
m from an upcoming packet shows that all state updates prior
to and including V2 have been replicated, the buffer releases
the held packet and frees its memory.
Other considerations: There may be time periods that a
chain receives no incoming packets. In such cases, the state
is not propagated through the chain, and the buffer does not
release packets. To resolve this problem, the forwarder keeps
a timer to receive incoming packets. Upon the timeout, the
forwarder sends a propagating packet carrying a piggyback
message it has received from the buffer. Replicas do not for-
ward a propagating packet to middleboxes. They process and
update the piggyback message as described before and for-
ward the packet along the chain. The buffer processes the
piggyback message to release held packets.
Some middlebox in a chain can filter packets (e.g., a fire-
wall may block certain traffic), and consequently the piggy-
backed state is not passed on. For such a middlebox, its head
generates a propagating packet to carry the piggyback mes-
sage of a filtered packet.
Finally, if the chain length is less than f + 1, we extend
the chain by adding more replicas prior to the buffer. These
replicas only process and update piggyback messages.
5.2 Failure Recovery
Handling the failure of the forwarder or the buffer is straight-
forward. They contain only soft state, and spawning a new
forwarder or a new buffer restores the chain.
The failure of a middlebox and its head replica is not iso-
lated, since they reside on the same server. If a replica fails,
FTC repairs f + 1 replication groups as each replica repli-
cates for f + 1 middleboxes. The recovery involves three
steps: spawning a new replica and a new middlebox, recover-
ing the lost state from other alive replicas, and steering traffic
through the new replica.
After spawning a new replica, the orchestrator informs it
about the list of replication groups in which the failed replica
was a member. For each of these replication group, the new
replica runs an independent state recovery procedure as fol-
lows. If the failed replica was the head of a replication group,
the new replica retrieves the state store and the dependency
vectorMAX from the immediate successor in this replication
group. The new replica restores the dependencymatrix of the
failed head by setting each of its row to the retrieved MAX .
Middlebox State reads State writes Chain Middleboxes in chain
MazuNAT Per packet Per flow Ch-n Monitor1 → ··· → Monitorn
SimpleNAT Per packet Per flow Ch-Gen Gen1 → Gen2
Monitor Per packet Per packet Ch-Rec Firewall→ Monitor→ SimpleNAT
Gen No Per packet
Firewall N/A N/A
Table 1: Experimental middleboxes and chains
For other replication groups, the new replica fetches the state
from the immediate predecessors in these replication groups.
Once the state is recovered, the new replica notifies the
orchestrator to update routing rules to steer traffic through
the new replica. For simultaneous failures, the orchestrator
waits until all new replicas confirm that they have finished
their state recovery procedures before updating routing rules.
6 Implementation
FTC builds on ONOS SDN controller [7] and Click [32]. The
forwarder and buffer are implemented as Click elements.
A replica consists of control and data planemodules. The
control module is a daemon that communicates with the
orchestrator and the control modules in other replicas. In
failover, the control module spawn a thread to fetch state per
each replication group. Using a reliable TCP connection, the
thread sends a fetch request to the appropriate member in the
replication group and waits to receive state.
The data plane module processes piggyback messages,
sends and receives packets to and from a middlebox, con-
structs piggyback messages, and forwards packets to a next
element in the chain (the data-plane module of the next
replica or the buffer).
FTC appends the piggyback logs to the end of a packet,
and inserts an IP option to notify our runtime that a packet
has a piggyback message. As a piggyback message is ap-
pended at the end of a packet, its process and construction
can be performed in-place, and there is no need to actually
strip and reattach it. Before sending a packet to the middle-
box, the relevant header fields (e.g., the total length in IP
header) is updated to not accounting for the piggyback mes-
sage. Before forwarding the packet to next replica, the header
is updated back to reconsider the piggyback message. For
middleboxes that may extend the packet, the data plane mod-
ule operates on the copy of a piggyback message.
7 Evaluation
We describe our setup and methodology in § 7.1. We bench-
mark the impact of state size on the performance of FTC in
§ 7.2. We measure the performance of FTC for middleboxes
in § 7.3 and for chains in § 7.4. Finally, we evaluate the fail-
ure recovery of FTC in § 7.5.
7.1 Experimental Setup and Methodology
We compare FTC with NF, a non fault-tolerant baseline sys-
tem, and FTMB, our implementation of [49]. Our FTMB imple-
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mentation is a performance upper bound of the original work
that performs the logging operations described in [49] but
does not take snapshots. Following the original prototype,
FTMB dedicates a server in which a middlebox master (M)
runs, and another server where the fault tolerant components
input logger (IL) and output logger (OL) execute. Packets
go through IL, M, then OL. M tracks accesses to shared state
using packet access logs (PALs) and transmits them to OL.
In the original prototype, no data packet is released until all
corresponding dropped PALs are retransmitted. Our proto-
type assumes that PALs are delivered on the first attempt,
and packets are released immediately afterwards. Further,
OL maintains only the last PAL.
We used two environments. The first is a local cluster of
12 servers. Each server has an 8-core Intel Xeon CPU D-
1540 clocked at 2.0 Ghz, 64 GiB of memory, and two NICs,
a 40 Gbps Mellanox ConnectX-3 and a 10 Gbps Intel Eth-
ernet Connection X557. The servers run Ubuntu 14.04 with
kernel 4.4 and are connected to 10 and 40 Gbps top-of-rack
switches. We use MoonGen [17] and pktgen [55] to gener-
ate traffic and measure latency and throughput, respectively.
Traffic from the generator server, passed in the 40 Gbps links,
is sent through middleboxes and back to the generator. FTC
uses a 10 Gbps link to disseminate state changes from buffer
to forwarder.
The second environment is a distributed Cloud com-
prised of several core and edge data-centers deployed across
Canada. We use virtual machines with 4 virtual processor
cores and 8 GiB memory running Ubuntu 14.04 with Kernel
4.4. We use the published ONOS docker container [37] to
control a virtual network of OVS switches [36] connecting
these virtual machines. We follow the multiple interleaved
trials methodology [4] to reduce the variability that come
from performing experiments on a shared infrastructure.
We use the middleboxes and chains shown in Table 1. The
middleboxes are implemented in Click [32]. MazuNAT is an
implementation of the core parts of a commercial NAT [2],
and SimpleNAT provides basic NAT functionalities. They
represent read-heavy middleboxes with a moderate write
load on the shared state. Monitor is a read/write heavy mid-
dlebox that counts the number of packets in a flow or across
flows. It takes a sharing level parameter that specifies the
number of threads sharing the same state variable. For ex-
ample, no state is shared for the sharing level 1, and all 8
threads share the same state variable for sharing level 8. Gen
represents a write-heavy middlebox that takes a state size pa-
rameter, which allows us to test the impact of a middlebox’s
state size on performance. Firewall is stateless. Our experi-
ments also test three chains comprised of these middleboxes,
namely Ch-n, Ch-Gen, and Ch-Rec.
For experiments in the first environment,we report latency
and throughput. For a latency data-point, we report the aver-
age of hundreds of samples taken in a 10 second interval. For
a throughput data-point, we report the average of maximum
throughput values measured every second in a 10-second in-
terval. Unless shown, we do not report confidence intervals
as they are negligible. Unless told otherwise, the packet size
in our experiments is 256 B, and f = 1.
7.2 Micro-benchmark
We use a micro-benchmark to determine the impact of a state
size on the performance of FTC. We measured the latency
overhead for the middlebox Gen and the chain Ch-Gen. We
observed that under 2 Mpps for 512 B packets, varying the
size of the generated state from 32–256 B has a negligible
impact on latency for both Gen and Ch-Gen (the difference is
less than 2 µs). Thus, we focus on the throughput overhead.
Throughput: Figure 5 shows the impact of state size gen-
erated by Gen on throughput. Gen runs a single thread. We
vary the state size andmeasure Gen’s throughput for different
packet sizes. As expected, the size of piggyback messages
impacts the throughput only if it is proportionally large com-
pared to packet sizes. For 128 B packets, throughput drops
by only 9% when Gen generates states that are 128 B in size
or less. The throughput drops by less than 1% with 512 B
packets and state up to 256 B in size.
We expect popular middleboxes to generate state much
smaller than some of our tested values. For instance, a load
balancer and a NAT generate a record per traffic flow [9, 27,
51] that is roughly 32 B in size (2×12 B for the IPv4 headers
in both directions and 8 B for the flow identifier).
7.3 Fault-Tolerant Middleboxes
Throughput: Figures 6 and 7 show the maximum through-
put of two middleboxes. In Figure 6, we configure Monitor
to run with eight threads and measure its throughput with
different sharing levels. As the sharing level for Monitor in-
creases, the throughput of all systems, including NF, drops
due to the higher contention in reading andwriting the shared
state. For sharing levels of 8 and 2, FTC achieves a through-
put that is 1.2× and 1.4× that of FTMB’s and incurs an over-
head of 9% and 26% compared to NF. These overheads are
expected since Monitor is a write-heavy middlebox, and the
shared state is modified non-deterministically per packet. For
sharing level 1, NF and FTC reach the NIC’s packet process-
ing capacity1. FTMB does not scale for sharing level 1, since
for every data packet, a PAL is transmitted in a separate mes-
sage, which limits FTMB’s throughput to 5.26 Mpps.
Figure 7 shows our evaluation for MazuNAT’s throughput
while varying the number of threads. FTC’s throughput is
1.37–1.94× that of FTMB’s for 1 to 4 threads. Once a traffic
1Although the 40 GbE link is not saturated, our investigation showed that
the bottleneck is the NIC’s packet processing power. We measured that the
Mellanox ConnectX-3 MT 27500, at the receiving side and working under
the DPDK driver, at most can process 9.6–10.6 Mpps for varied packet sizes.
Though we have not found any official document by Mellanox describing
this limitation, similar behavior (at higher rates) has been reported for Intel
NICs (see Sections 5.4 and 7.5 in [17] and Section 4.6 in [25]).
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Figure 8: Latency of middleboxes
flow is recorded in the NAT flow table, processing next pack-
ets of this flow only requires reading the shared record (until
the connection terminates or times out). The higher through-
put compared for MazuNAT is because FTC does not repli-
cate the reads, while FTMB logs them to provide fault toler-
ance [49]. We observe that FTC incurs 1–10% throughput
overhead compared to NF. Part of this overhead is because
FTC has to pay the cost of adding space to packets for possi-
ble state writes, even when state writes are not performed.
The pattern of state reads and writes impacts FTC’s
throughput. Under moderate write workloads, FTC incurs
1–10% throughput overhead, while under write-heavy work-
loads, FTC’s overhead remains less than 26%.
Latency: Figure 8 shows the latency of Monitor (8 threads
with sharing level 8) and MazuNAT (two configurations, 1
thread and 8 threads) under different traffic loads. For the
both middleboxes, the latency remains under 0.7 ms for all
systems as the traffic load increases, until the systems reach
their respective saturation points. Past these points, packets
start to be queued, and per-packet latency rapidly spikes.
As shown in Figure 8a, under sustainable loads, FTC and
FTMB respectively introduce overhead within 14–25 µs and
22–31 µs to the per packet latency, out of which 6–7 µs is due
to the extra one way network latency to forward the packet
and state to the replica. For this write heavy middlebox, FTC
adds a smaller latency overhead compared to FTMB.
Figure 8b shows that, when running MazuNAT with one
thread, FTC can sustain nearly the same traffic load as NF,
and FTC and FTMB have similar latencies. For eight threads
shown in Figure 8c, both FTC and NF reach the packet pro-
cessing capacity of the NIC. The latency of FTC is largely in-
dependent of the number of threads, while FTMB experiences
a latency increase of 24–43 µs when going from one to eight
threads.
7.4 Fault Tolerant Chains
In this section, we report the performance of FTC for a chain
of middleboxes during normal operation. For a NF chain,
each middlebox is deployed in a separate physical server. We
does not needmore servers, while we dedicate twice the num-
ber of servers to FTMB: A server for each middlebox (Master
in FTMB) and a server for its replica (IL and OL in FTMB).
Chain length impact on throughput: Figure 9 shows
the maximum traffic throughput passing in four chains
(Ch-2 to Ch-5 listed in Table 1). Monitors in these chains
run eight threads with sharing level 1. We also report for
FTMB+Snapshot that is FTMB with snapshot simulation. To
simulate the overhead of periodic snapshots, we add an arti-
ficial delay (6 ms) periodically (every 50 ms). We get these
values from [49].
As shown in Figure 9, FTC’s throughput is within 8.28–
8.92 Mpps and 4.83–4.80 Mpps for FTMB. FTC imposes a 6–
13% throughput overhead compared to NF. The throughput
drop from increasing the chain length for FTC is within 2–
7%, while that of FTMB+Snapshot is 13–39% (its throughput
drops from 3.94 to 2.42 Mpps).
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Figure 11: Ch-3 per packet latency
This shows that throughput of FTC is largely indepen-
dent of the chain length, while, for FTMB+Snapshot, periodic
snapshots taken at all middleboxes significantly reduce the
throughput. No packet is processed during a snapshot. Packet
queues get full at early snapshots and remain full afterwards
because the incoming traffic load is at the same rate. More
snapshots are taken in a longer chain. Non-overlapping (in
time) snapshots cause shorter service time at each period and
consequently higher throughput drops. An optimum schedul-
ing to synchronize snapshots across the chain can reduce this
overhead; however, this is not trivial [10].
Chain length impact on latency: We use the same exper-
imental settings as the previous experiment, except we run
single threaded Monitors due to a limitation of the traffic
generator. The latter is not able to measure the latency of the
chain beyond size 2 composed of multithreadedmiddleboxes.
We resort to use single threaded Monitors under the load of
2 Mpps, a sustainable load by all systems.
As shown in Figure 10, FTC’s overhead compared to NF
is within 39–104 µs for Ch-2 to Ch-5, translating to roughly
20 µs latency per middlebox. The overhead of FTMB is within
64–171 µs, approximately 35 µs latency overhead per middle-
box in the chain. As shown in Figure 11, the tail latency of
individual packets passing through Ch-3 is only moderately
higher than the minimum latency. FTC incurs 16.5–20.6 µs
per middlebox latency which is respectively three and two or-
ders of magnitudes less than Pico’s and REINFORCE’s, and
is around 2/3 of FTMB’s.
In-chain replication eliminates the communication over-
head with remote replicas. Doing so also does not cause la-
tency spikes unlike snapshot-based systems. In FTC, packets
experience constant latency,while the original FTMB reports
up to 6 ms latency spikes at periodic checkpoints (e.g., at ev-
ery 50 ms intervals) [49].
Replication factor impact on performance: For replica-
tion factors of 2–5 (i.e., tolerating 1 to 5 failures), Figure 12
shows FTC’s performance for Ch-5 in two settings where
Monitors run with 1 or 8 threads. We report the throughput
of 8 threaded Monitor, while only report the latency of 1
threaded Monitor due to a limitation of our test harness.
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To tolerate 2.5× failures, FTC incurs only 3% throughput
overhead as its throughput decreases to 8.06 Mpps. The la-
tency overhead is also insignificant as latency only increases
by 8 µs. By exploiting the chain structure, FTC can tolerate
a higher number of failures without sacrificing performance.
However, the replication factor cannot be arbitrarily large as
encompassing the resulting large piggyback messages inside
packets becomes impractical.
7.5 FTC in Failure Recovery
Recall from § 6, failure recovery is performed in three steps
that incure initialization, state recovery, and rerouting delays.
To evaluate FTC during recovery, we measure the recovery
time of Ch-Rec (see Table 1). Each middlebox is placed in
a different region of our Cloud testbed. As the orch detects
a failure, a new replica is placed in the same region as the
failed middlebox. The head of Firewall is deployed in the
same region as the orch, while the heads of SimpleNAT and
Monitor are respectively deployed in a neighboring region
and a remote region compared to the orch’s region. Since the
orch is also a SDN controller, we observe negligible values
for the rerouting delay, thus we focus on the state recovery
delay and initialization delay.
Recovery time: As shown in Figure 13, the initialization
delays are 1.2, 49.8, and 5.3 ms for Firewall, Monitor,
and SimpleNAT, respectively. The longer the distance be-
tween the orch and the new replica, the higher the initial-
ization delay. The state recovery delays are in the range of
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114.38± 9.38 ms to 270.79± 50.47 ms2. In a local area net-
work, FTMB paper [49] reports comparable recovery time
of∼100 ms to 250 ms for SimpleNAT. The WAN latency be-
tween two remote regions becomes the dominant delay dur-
ing failover, because a new replica fetches state from a re-
mote region upon any failure. Using ping, we measured the
network delay between all pairs of remote regions, and the
observed round-trip times confirmed our results.
FTC replicates the values of state variables, and its state
recovery delay is bounded by the state size of a middlebox.
The replication factor also has a negligible impact on the re-
covery time of FTC, since a new instantiated replica fetches
state in parallel from other replicas.
8 Related Work
We already discussed NFV related work in § 2.2. Next, we
position FTC related to three lines of work.
Fault tolerant storage: Prior to FTC, the distributed sys-
tem literature used chain and ring structures to provide fault
tolerance. However, their focus is on ordering read/writemes-
sages at the process level (compared to, middlebox threads
racing to access shared state in our case), at lower non-
determinism rates (compared to, per-packet frequency), and
at lower output rates (compared to, several Mpps releases).
A class of systems adapt the chain replication proto-
col [56] for key-value storages. In HyperDex [18] and Hi-
bari [21], servers shape multiple logical chains replicating
different key ranges. NetChain [26] replicates in the network
on a chain of programmable switches. FAWN [5], Flex-KV
[41], and parameter server [35] leverage consistent hashing
to form a replication ring of servers. Unlike these systems,
FTC takes advantage of the natural structure of service func-
tion chains, uses transactional packet processing, and piggy-
backs state updates on packets.
Primary backup replication: In active replication [47],
all replicas process requests. This scheme requires determin-
ism in middlebox operations, while middleboxes are non-
deterministic [15, 25]. In passive replication [8], only a pri-
mary server processes requests and sends state updates to
other replicas. This scheme makes no assumption about de-
terminism. Generic virtual machine high availability solu-
tions [12,16,46] pause a virtual machine per each checkpoint.
These solutions are not effective for chains, since the chain
operations pauses during long checkpoints.
Consensus protocols: Classical consensus protocols, such
as Paxos [34] and Raft [38] are known to be slow and cause
unacceptable low performance if used for middleboxes.
2The large confidence intervals reported are due to latency variability in
the wide area network connecting different regions.
9 Conclusion
Existing fault tolerant middlebox frameworks can introduce
high performance penalties when they are used for a service
function chain. This paper presented FTC, a system that takes
advantage of the structure of a chain to provide efficient fault
tolerance. Our evaluation demonstrates that FTC can provide
high degrees of fault tolerance with low overhead in terms of
latency and throughput of a chain.
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